MOSCOW ATTACK: WHY RUSSIA?

On March 22, 2024 a group of four or five terrorists attacked the Crocus City Hall outside Moscow. Armed with AK assault rifles, the attackers kept firing into the crowd, stopping only to reload. At some point, one or two of them also poured gasoline in one part of the building and set it on fire.

The attack, the rampage and the fire, which collapsed part of the hall, left 140 Muscovites dead and nearly 80 injured. While IS’s Middle East core took responsibility for the attack, US intelligence reports indicate the attack was planned and executed by the so-called Islamic State’s ‘Khorasan Province’ franchise, ISKP.

Russia has been in the jihadi crosshairs since Soviet times. The war in Afghanistan catalysed the break-up of the Soviet Union and also introduced the jihadi struggle into long-repressed Muslim Soviet Republics of the Soviet Union. The Central Asian Republics, especially Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, have been troubled by Islamist groups since the early ’90s.

The area of the Ferghana Valley, shared by Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, has been particularly susceptible to such influences. That’s where Juma Namangani, a former Uzbek Soviet paratrooper who had fought in Afghanistan, created the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, along with Tahir Yaldashev. Namangani had also fought in Tajikistan’s civil war. He was killed in an airstrike in November 2001, during the US-led invasion of Afghanistan, while Yaldashev was killed in a US Predator drone strike in 2009 in Zhob, Balochistan.

The situation in the ‘90s was given a fillip by Russia’s two wars in Chechnya, especially the second Russo-Chechen War of 1999. The wars also exposed Russia to Chechen and Dagestani militant attacks. The Chechen insurgency itself split into nationalists and global jihadis. Chechen women, shahidkas (Black Widows), introduced suicide bombing, starting in the noughties. They staged many high-profile attacks, including eight of the 10 suicide bombings in the Russian capital.

Russia’s military and diplomatic help to Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria has also been a reason for reprisal attacks by IS. On September 6, 2022, an ISKP suicide bomber blew himself up outside the Russian embassy in Kabul. The attack killed six people, including two members of Russian embassy staff.

Russia has also taken a forward-leaning security posture since the US withdrawal from Afghanistan, including through military presence in Tajikistan, where it also holds joint counter-terrorism and military exercises with Tajikistan.

The Syria war informs IS’s memory, especially the defeat and the group’s dislodging from the territory. IS attacks inside Iran are seen as revenge for Tehran and its proxies’ anti-ISIS role in Syria and Iraq. This explains the ISKP attack in January this year in Kerman, Iran, at the anniversary commemoration of Maj Gen Qasem Soleimani, who was instrumental in Iran’s operations in Syria and Iraq. The attack killed over 90 people and left over a hundred injured.

Prior to both attacks, the US had warned Iran and Russia of imminent extremist attacks. Russian President Vladimir Putin is reported to have dismissed the warning, accusing the US of sowing fear. Putin has since been pushing the line about Ukraine’s involvement in the attack, a charge that has been rejected by Kyiv. In the meantime, Russian security agencies have also arrested four Tajik nationals. When produced before the court, they showed visible signs of torture. Many experts believe Russia may not have the right perpetrators of the attack.